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TIEBOUT OR SAMUELSON:
THE 21ST CENTURY DESERVES MORE
EDWARD J. HUCK*
For more than 35 years, the issue of municipal consolidation has brought
attention to an article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, by Charles
Tiebout.1 Tiebout's article, a rebuttal of an article authored by economist Paul
Samuelson, has defined the boundaries of modem urban policy debate.
Advocates of both Tiebout and Samuelson contend that the authors articulate
polar opposite opinions in the still-hot debate on whether it is better
government to have a myriad of small municipalities or fewer large units of
government. Samuelson emphasizes social and economic justice, and Tiebout
advocates economic efficiency.
I contend they are not mutually exclusive in terms of an outcome. That is,
it is not necessary to consolidate in order to reach economic and social justice,
but consolidation may be the final outcome if Tiebout's publication is taken as
gospel.
Here is the story. In 1956, when centralizing government was a pretty
intellectually appealing answer to the problems of social economic efficiency,
Tiebout voiced a compelling argument against consolidation. He advocated
that providing a range of local municipal choices was imperative because
"people vote with their feet." That is, people will simply move to a
community that offers a level of services that suits them.2 In Tiebout's model,
each citizen chooses the community that best satisfies his or her own
particular demands. Competition, thereby, provides that all citizens in each
community agree on their service levels. Today, Tiebout's followers believe
that local competition is the perfect solution.
Tiebout strongly refuted Paul Samuelson's 1954 article, The Pure Theory
of Public Expenditures.3 Samuelson had analyzed the "free rider problem,"
the concern that some folks would try to reduce their own tax burden while
enjoying the benefits of services supplied by another taxpayer. This free

* Executive Director, Wisconsin Alliance of Cities. Presentation at the Wisconsin Tax Policy
Colloquium, Marquette University Law School, April 15-16, 2004.
1. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).

2. id.
3. Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 350
(1954).
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ridership creates a range of tax and service disparities for municipalities. In
Samuelson's model, because markets do not always provide public goods
efficiently, some form of governmental intervention is needed. Today, many
of Samuelson's followers advocate the merger of multiple municipalities by
state or federal mandate.
The polarism created by Samuelson and Tiebout reappears today
whenever there is talk of municipal government mergers, annexation, or
regionalism. The questions of economic and social justice, or for that matter,
economies of scale and diseconomies of scale, almost never seem to seep into
the discussion together. We continue to create neat little boxes of debate; big
is bad and small is good or vice-versa. Rarely are these points of view
exclusively right. How about the possibility that both Tiebout and Samuelson
are right,at leastpartially? What if we reframe the urban policy debate along
multiple dimensions?
If we agree that "Tiebout's Hypothesis," which assumes that citizens can
"vote with their feet," is correct only in that persons with certain incomes
have that ability, then we can move forward and deal with exclusionary
zoning and racism. In 1957, neither was much considered. Nor were there
many differences in corporate culture, ownership, or behavior. Today,
"[c]ompanies increasingly go, and are started, where talented and creative
people are." 4 Not so in 1957. Let us not use Tiebout to continue racial
segregation along with wealth and poverty segregation in 2004. The point
often made is that any government organization that prevents the mobilization
of a people because of race is wrong. 5 But does this mean regional
government? Does this mean municipal mergers are the only way to achieve
social and economic justice?
We should also recognize that Tiebout was right about providing
government services that may become less useful to others or have little utility
for others. People who have the income to move will move when they feel
the services and the environment provided by their city no longer justify the
taxes they pay. We cannot rope them in. We must find ways to focus on
efficiency and quality of life. Building walls to keep people in is not any
more right than keeping them out. So now what?

4. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 283 (2002).
5. REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM (Bruce Katz ed. 2000); BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY AUSTIN
TURNER, WHO SHOULD RUN THE HOUSING VOUCHER PROGRAM? A REFORM PROPOSAL (2000), at
http://www.brook.edu/es/urban/vouchers/report.pdf.
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1. MAYOR HENRY MAIER, BRUCE KATZ, MYRON ORFIELD, DAVID RUSK,
AND ME
I started working for city governments in 1984. The Honorable Henry
Maier was Mayor of the great City of Milwaukee. You could count on the
Mayor for two quotes: "Those bastards at the Milwaukee Journal"and "Those
goddamn suburbs!" The Mayor, as well as every mayor today, knows that a
full-service city must prepare to serve both daytime and nighttime
populations. The infrastructure and services provided 24-7 to families,
commerce, and its workforce, health care facilities, universities, and many
other institutions of learning and government serve many people beyond the
residents of the city. Mayor Maier was constantly aware that people of wealth
could live near his great city and never pay for all the benefits it provided.
Today, those first-ring suburbs are Milwaukee's allies against a new ring of
suburban growth. Eventually, this new ring will join an unenviable club. The
fact remains that when concentration of poverty and wealth are in close
proximity and in different political jurisdictions, there are going to be
problems that cannot be solved within the borders of any single jurisdiction.
Before someone accuses me of being an apostle of Bruce Katz, Myron
Orfield, and David Rusk, let me declare that I am an apostle of Bruce Katz,
Myron Orfield, and David Rusk.6 I also believe in regional solutions. These
men have brought new and exciting ideas on revenue sharing, housing
policies, race, and income policies. Like a breath of fresh air, they filled me
with ideas and energy to find a new way for Wisconsin.
For almost 20 years, I have worked for more than two dozen mayors who
govern cities that range from 8500 to 575,000 in population. They all know
the importance of serving the public, which is no small task. Their work,
which used to receive accolades and honor, is now chastised by state and
federal politicians trying to make points with a cynical public, both on the left
and right of the political spectrum. City leaders' goals are related to building
their cities through economic development, housing development,
transportation systems, and a quality of life that entices young people,
regardless of race or religious orientation.
What these leaders need are the tools to govern better. Those tools can
take shape by looking at a natural economic area (Metropolitan Statistical
Area) and creating a regional focus for land use, housing, transportation,
economic vitality, and revenue sharing.

6. See supra note 5. See also MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW
SUBURBAN REALITY (2002); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME (1999); DAVID
RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (2d ed. 1995).
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II. REVENUE SHARING CAN REDUCE THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE
In Wisconsin, we have a system of intergovernmental transfer from state

revenues called "state shared revenues." It is a program with the goal to
neutralize tax base and tax rate differences among local governments.
Through the shared revenue program, Wisconsin distributes state tax revenues
to municipal and county governments for use at their discretion. The program
is a fundamental element of Wisconsin's local finance structure and the state's
overall program of property tax relief. 7 Wisconsin's practice of sharing state
taxes with local governments dates back to 1911, when a share of the new
state income tax was earmarked for local governments to compensate them
for property tax exemptions for intangible property and household
furnishings. The shared revenue program is successful, but it is constantly
under siege. The state budget allocates each year more than $900 million of
general-purpose revenues into the program. This irritates some conservative
legislators, who believe in the Tiebout theories, even if they are not aware of
the genesis of their thoughts. The truth is, however, the program does a
decent job of making sure that every municipality in the state can compete for

jobs and people. Most of the revenue is distributed through an entitlement
that uses two factors: (1) per capita property wealth and (2) net local revenue
effort. The lower a local government's per capita property wealth and the
higher its net revenue effort, the greater the local government's revenue
entitlement. 9
Why is such a wonderful program not duplicated more often? Because
Tiebout's hypothesis is often used to confuse the public and accuse local
governments of spending other peoples' money. Of course, no one questions
the practice in the NFL where teams share revenue to ensure each team can
compete. That is a good thing. My friend and colleague Dan Thompson,
Director of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, points out that revenue
sharing occurs within every city today between rich and poor. It just goes
unnoticed. This is why the consolidation of many cities into one or the
creation of a regional government is appealing to so many politicians.
The criticisms of shared revenues in Wisconsin are twofold: first, it is too
closely tied to spending at the local level, and second, there is no connection
between revenues received from the state and revenues raised locally. The
criticisms are more political than policy, but they are threatening to the
program. The spending issue can be addressed by going to a foundation plan

7. Information Paper, SharedRevenue Program,WIS. LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU.

8. Id.
9. Id.
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and by defining "need."' 0 A foundation plan would require a mill rate effort
before state aid would be given. Need can be defined by measuring relative
income, poverty, and property values within a defined region. The logistics of
regional revenue sharing are more difficult.
III. REGIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In Wisconsin, cities and villages have constitutional "home rule" powers.
This means that unless the state legislature expressly restricts cities and
villages from an action, the local government can go forward. I mention this
because county government does not have constitutional legal standing. That
is, city and village governments are legally stronger than county government.
To further complicate legal matters in Wisconsin, there is case law that says
that state government cannot force one level of government to levy a tax and
give it involuntarily to another level of government."1 This makes regional
revenue sharing, as most would conceive it, impossible under current law.
Functionally what this means is that, in order to create tax-base sharing,
the state would need to create "regional government." There would have to
be a constitutional change that recognizes regional government and places it
within the context of Wisconsin law.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

In 1846, the Wisconsin Territory held its first constitutional convention.
Article XVIII, section 2, stated:
Every tenth year after this constitution shall have taken effect it shall
be the duty of the legislature to submit to the people at the next annual
election the question whether they are in favor of calling a convention
to revise the constitution or not; and a majority of the qualified
electors voting thereon shall have voted in favor of a convention, the
legislature shall at its next session provide by law for holding a
convention, to be holden [sic] within six months thereafter; and such
convention shall consist of a number of members not less than that of
the house of2 representatives, nor more than that of both houses of the
legislature. 1

10. MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS LUCE, WISCONSIN METROPATTERNS: REGIONAL
COOPERATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002).
11. See generally Jack Stark, The Authority to Tax in Wisconsin, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 466

(1994).
12. The

1919).

Convention of 1846, in 1I Wis. HIST. PUB. COLLECTIONS (Constitutional Series,
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The electorate rejected the constitution, and this language was not
included in the 1848 constitution.
The Wisconsin Alliance of Cities has called for a new convention without
a predetermined outcome. We believe regional government is an option that
our state should consider as part of the debate over a new constitution.
Nineteenth century government cannot continue if we are to compete in this
"New World" economy. But constitutional conventions do not come easily,
and there are many questions that legally need to be answered about what it
would take to call a convention in Wisconsin. In some other states that do not
have the barriers that Wisconsin has, consolidation and regional government
already exist.
V. To AVOID REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, STATE GOVERNMENT MUST
INTERVENE

How do we share revenue regionally without creating a regional
government? The answer lies in state government. State government can
create regions by legislation. New legislation could require the Department of
Revenue to measure income, sales, and:property value growth within each of
the regions and apply a predetermined rate against the growth. The revenue
3
then could be divided and distributed on a "need" or "equalizing" basis.'
The regions could follow the lines of Metropolitan Statistical Areas or,
where there are none, combine the remaining counties into a statewide
program. The idea is that, in a defined area, everyone has a stake in economic
growth. The idea of defining community as a region is not unheard of. The
"Valley" in California, "Utopia" in Utah, and Hwy. 128 in Massachusetts are
illustrations. Branding and regionally marketing need a thread to bind them
together. That thread is regional revenue sharing for local governments.
Many business people do not understand the dynamics of urban decay or
the real costs associated with decline. More importantly, it is not understood
that the decline is, a cancer that starts at the core and works its way outward.
It drives taxes up in older areas with higher concentrations of poverty and
drives taxes up in newer suburban/ex-urban communities because of
redundancy of infrastructure and other marginal costs.
Revenue sharing, at least on a regional level, is essential for every state in
13. Wisconsin could define the natural economic regions where most people live and work as
follows: Region one: Douglas County; Region two: Pierce and St. Croix Counties; Region three: Eau
Claire and Chippewa Counties; Region four: La Crosse County; Region five: Marathon, Wood, and
Portage Counties; Region six: Brown, Winnebago, Calumet, Outagamie, and Fond du Lac Counties;
Region Seven: Sheboygan County; Region Eight: Milwaukee, Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington
Counties; Region Nine: Racine County; Region Ten: Kenosha County; Region Eleven: Dane County;
Region Twelve: Rock County.
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America.
Regional revenue sharing can mitigate the impacts of
developmental sprawl and encourage local government leaders to overcome
local competition and instead build the region. But it is only part of the
picture.
VI. INCLUSIONARY ZONING, REGIONAL LAND USE, AND ECONOMIC
PLANNING AND UTILITIES COMPLETE THE PACKAGE

In addition to regional revenue sharing, we need a nongovernmental body
to coordinate data collection and planning, assess strengths and weaknesses
within any economic region, analyze economic trends, and incorporate goals
that can be measured with strategies for implementation. This should be a
nongovernmental institution, an institute, if you will, to educate and
recommend policy changes that deal with economic development, land use,
and inclusionary housing laws.
The fundamental purpose of inclusionary zoning is to allow the
development of affordable housing to become an integral part of
development. The zoning requirement could be voluntary (offering developer
incentives) or mandatory. An inclusionary zoning ordinance would set forth a
minimum percentage of units to be provided in a specific residential
development that are affordable to households at a given income level,
defined as a percentage of the median income of the area.
The key is inclusionary zoning across incomes in every neighborhood.
Today we bus students from neighborhood to neighborhood in order to
equalize the distribution of poor or minority students within a school district.
In Milwaukee, we use vouchers so parents can choose between public and
private schools. We do this because we know that poorer income students
accomplish greater academic success when exposed to other students. 14
As stated before, systems of local government that do not allow for the
freedom of movement within our society by income or race are wrong. Even
with revenue sharing and regional marketing, we cannot ignore concentrations
of poverty and the impacts on many families. Inclusionary zoning creates
better outcomes than government consolidation because it integrates
neighborhoods, not cities.
In an editorial by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, dated September 16,
2002, the Editors asked: "Why not propose regional transportation authority
that would cover airports, rail and highways? Or maybe a planning board that
could coordinate development across the area? What about creating a

14. David Rusk has done extensive work in this area.
GAME/OUTSIDE GAME 325-26 (1999).

See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, INSIDE
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regional authority for the various sports and arts15 venues in the metropolitan
area? What about merging some governments?"
Families in Wisconsin (and likely everywhere) really do not care who
provides a particular service, only that it be done efficiently and at the least
amount of cost to the taxpayer. Contracts between local governments are an
effective and politically appealing way of reducing marginal costs. The
creation of "utilities" that cross local political lines to provide service is, in a
word, doable.
Utilities are another way of accomplishing the outcomes of Samuelson
and Tiebout without consolidation of municipal governments. Regional
service delivery should be based on capturing economies of scale, not
consolidating governments. Elimination of redundancy, which may include
mixing private sector with government sector employees, can occur when two
or more municipalities create a regional utility.
Creating utilities can increase the use of fees to offset Wisconsin's high
property taxes. Only eight states rely on the property tax to a greater extent
than Wisconsin for their local revenue. When fees are not counted in
comparing state tax burdens, Wisconsin is frequently listed in the top 10 for
tax burden. The greater use of fees is a fair way of getting Wisconsin out of
the top 10.
Fees must have a close nexus to the service being provided.' 6 A fee for
services offered, not rendered, as a per square-foot fee for fire service, could
significantly reduce property taxes. Services rendered would require that the
fee be assessed only if the fire truck came to your house. Services offered
means they need only to be available to come to your house. (This would
require a legislative change in Wisconsin.) In addition, the fees would shift
the burden to all property owners, allowing for discrimination of the fees,
based on inventory and height of building, and would relieve homeowners
from the subsidization of large institutions and manufacturing properties.
Regional utilities for garbage, recycling, and landfill siting could also
bring savings and again be funded by fees. Road plowing and maintenance
are other possibilities. Concentrating on service levels and efficiency instead
of governmental incorporation allows for total creativity. Consolidation of
municipalities is less likely to allow for the kind of creativity that contract law
can accommodate.

15. Why Thinking Big Is Better, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Sept. 16, 2002, at A10.
16. Town of Janesville v. Rock County, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 451 N.W.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1989).
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VII. CONCLUSION

If social justice issues and issues such as the "free rider" described by
Samuelson are not considered, there are likely to be more calls for (if not
more) government consolidation. But it need not be. Both conservatives and
liberals should consider the package I have described: regional revenue
sharing, inclusionary zoning, and utility regional service delivery. Zoning
law changes would reduce the need for school busing. Revenue sharing
would reduce the need to consolidate or annex property. Regional utilities
would reduce property taxes and increase efficient allocation of costs.
In the end, it is not whether Samuelson or Tiebout is right. It is about
better government and better service to the taxed public in the twenty-first
century.

*

*

*

